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Abstract
Humans have been shown to adapt to the temporal statistics of timing tasks so as to optimize the accuracy of their
responses, in agreement with the predictions of Bayesian integration. This suggests that they build an internal
representation of both the experimentally imposed distribution of time intervals (the prior) and of the error (the loss
function). The responses of a Bayesian ideal observer depend crucially on these internal representations, which have only
been previously studied for simple distributions. To study the nature of these representations we asked subjects to
reproduce time intervals drawn from underlying temporal distributions of varying complexity, from uniform to highly
skewed or bimodal while also varying the error mapping that determined the performance feedback. Interval reproduction
times were affected by both the distribution and feedback, in good agreement with a performance-optimizing Bayesian
observer and actor model. Bayesian model comparison highlighted that subjects were integrating the provided feedback
and represented the experimental distribution with a smoothed approximation. A nonparametric reconstruction of the
subjective priors from the data shows that they are generally in agreement with the true distributions up to third-order
moments, but with systematically heavier tails. In particular, higher-order statistical features (kurtosis, multimodality) seem
much harder to acquire. Our findings suggest that humans have only minor constraints on learning lower-order statistical
properties of unimodal (including peaked and skewed) distributions of time intervals under the guidance of corrective
feedback, and that their behavior is well explained by Bayesian decision theory.
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Introduction
The ability to estimate motor-sensory time intervals in the
subsecond range and react accordingly is fundamental in many
behaviorally relevant circumstances [1], such as dodging a blow or
assessing causality (‘was it me producing that noise?’). Since
sensing of time intervals is inherently noisy [2], it is typically
advantageous to enhance time estimates with previous knowledge
of the temporal context. It has been shown in various timing
experiments that humans can take into account some relevant
temporal statistics of a task according to Bayesian decision theory,
such as in sensorimotor coincidence timing [3], tactile simultaneity
judgements [4], planning movement duration [5] and time
interval estimation [6–8].
Most of these studies [3,4,6,8] exposed the participants to time
intervals whose duration followed some simple distribution (e.g. a
Gaussian or a uniform distribution), and then assumed that the
subjects’ internal representation of it corresponded to the
experimental distribution. As a more realistic working hypothesis,
we can expect the observers to have acquired, after training, an
internal representation of the statistics of the temporal intervals
which is an approximation of the true, objective experimental
distribution. It can be argued that this approximation in most cases
would be ‘similar enough’ to the true distribution, so that in
practice the distinction between subjective and objective distribu-
tion is an unnecessary complication. This is not exact though, first
of all because it is unknown whether the similarity assumption
would hold for complex temporal distributions, and secondly
because the specific form of the approximation can lead to
observable differences in behavior even for simple cases (see
Figure 1).
We propose that understanding how humans learn and
approximate temporal statistics in a given context can help
explaining observed temporal biases and illusions [9]. Previous
studies have shown that human observers exhibit specific
idiosyncrasies in judging simultaneity and temporal order of
stimuli after repeated exposure to a specific inter-stimulus lag
(temporal recalibration) [4,10,11], in encoding certain kinds of
temporal distributions in the subsecond range [12] or in
estimating durations of very rare stimuli (oddballs) [13], so it is
worth asking whether people are able to acquire an internal
representation of complex (e.g. very peaked, bimodal) distribu-
tions of inter-stimulus intervals in the first place, and what are
their limitations.
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Bayesian decision theory (BDT) provides a neat and successful
framework for representing the internal beliefs of an ideal observer
in terms of a (subjective) prior distribution, and it gives a
normative account on how the ideal observer should take action
[14]. A large number of behavioral studies are consistent with a
Bayesian interpretation [15–17] and some results suggest that
human subjects build internal representations of priors and
likelihoods [15,18,19] or likelihood and loss functions [20]. We
therefore adopted BDT as a framework to infer the subjects’
acquired beliefs about the experimental distributions. However,
the behavior of a Bayesian ideal observer depends crucially not
only on the prior, but also on the likelihoods and the loss function,
with an underlying degeneracy, i.e. distinct combinations of
distributions can lead to the same empirical behavior [21]. It
follows that a proper analysis of the internal representations
cannot be separated from an appropriate modelling of the
likelihoods and the loss function as well.
With this in mind, we analyzed the timing responses of human
observers for progressively more complex temporal distributions of
durations in a motor-sensory time interval reproduction task. We
provided performance feedback (also known as ‘knowledge of
results’, or KR) on a trial-by-trial basis, which constrained the loss
function, speeded up learning and allowed the subjects to adjust
their behavior, therefore providing an upper bound on human
performance [22,23]. We carried out a full Bayesian model
comparison analysis among a discrete set of candidate likelihoods,
priors and loss functions in order to find the observer model most
supported by the data, characterizing the behavior of each
individual subject across multiple conditions. Having inferred the
form of the likelihoods and loss functions for each subject, we
could then perform a nonparametric reconstruction [24] of what
the subjects’ prior distributions would look like under the
assumptions of our framework and we compared them with the
experimental distributions. The inferred priors suggest that people
learn smoothed approximations of the experimental distributions
which take into account not only mean and variance but also
higher-order statistics, although some complex features (kurtosis,
bimodality) seem to deviate systematically from those of the
experimental distribution.
Results
Subjects took part in a time interval reproduction task with
performance feedback (trial structure depicted in Figure 2 top; see
Methods for full details). On each trial subjects clicked a mouse
button and, after a time interval (x ms) that could vary from trial-
to-trial, saw a yellow dot flash on the screen. They were then
required to hold down the mouse button to reproduce the
perceived interval between the original click and the flash. The
duration of this mouse press constituted their response (r ms) for
that trial. Subjects received visual feedback on their performance,
with an error bar that was displayed either to the left or right of a
central zero-error line, depending on whether their response was
shorter or longer than the true interval duration. In different
experimental blocks we varied both the statistical distribution of
the intervals, p(x), and the nature of the performance feedback,
i.e. mapping between the interval/response pair and the error
display, f (x,r), relative to the zero-error line. For each experi-
mental block, subjects first performed training sessions until their
performance was stable (around 500 to 1500 trials), followed by
two test sessions (about 500 trials per session). Testing with a block
was completed before starting a new one.
Different groups of subjects took part in five experiments, whose
setup details are summarized in Table 1 (see also Methods). In
brief, Experiment 1 represented a basic test for the experimental
paradigm and modelling framework with simple (Uniform)
distributions over different ranges. Experiment 2 compared
subjects’ responses in a simple condition (Uniform) vs a complex
one (Peaked, one interval was over-represented), over the same
range of intervals. Experiment 3 verified the effect of feedback on
subjects’ responses by imposing a different error mapping f (x,r).
Experiment 4 tested subjects in a more extreme version of the
Peaked distribution. Experiment 5 verified the limits of subjects’
capability of learning with bimodal distributions of intervals.
We first present the results of the first two experiments in a
qualitative manner, and then describe a quantitative model.
Results of the other three experiments that test specific aspects
of the model or more complex distributions are presented
thereafter.
Experiment 1: Uniform distributions over different ranges
In the first experiment the distribution of time intervals
consisted of a set of six equally spaced discrete times with equal
probability according to either a Short Uniform (450–825 ms) or
Long Uniform (750–1125 ms) distribution. The order of these
blocks was randomized across subjects. The feedback followed a
Skewed error mapping fSk!
r{x
r
. The ‘artificial’ response-
dependent asymmetry in the Skewed mapping was chosen to test
whether participants would integrate the provided feedback error
into their decision process, as opposed to other possibly more
natural forms of error, such as the Standard error fSt!r{x or
the Fractional error fFr!
r{x
x
(see later, Bayesian model
comparison).
We examined the mean bias in the response (mean reproduc-
tion interval minus actual interval, r{x, also termed ‘constant
error’ in the psychophysical literature), as a function of the actual
interval (Figure 3 top). Subjects’ responses showed a regression to
the mean consistent with a Bayesian process that integrates the
prior with sensory evidence [4,6,8,15]. That is, little bias was seen
for intervals that matched the mean of the prior (637.5 ms for
Author Summary
Human performance in a timing task depends on the
context of recently experienced time intervals. In fact,
people may use prior experience to improve their timing
performance. Given the relevance of time for both sensing
and acting in the world, how humans learn and represent
temporal information is a fundamental question in
neuroscience. Here, we ask subjects to reproduce the
duration of time intervals drawn from different distribu-
tions (different temporal contexts). We build a set of
models of how people might behave in such a timing task,
depending on how they are representing the temporal
context. Comparison between models and data allows us
to establish that in general subjects are integrating task-
relevant temporal information with the provided error
feedback to enhance their timing performance. Analysis of
the subjects’ responses allows us to reconstruct their
internal representation of the temporal context, and we
compare it with the true distribution. We find that with the
help of corrective feedback humans can learn good
approximations of unimodal distributions of time intervals
used in the experiment, even for skewed distributions of
durations; on the other hand, under similar conditions, we
find that multimodal distributions of timing intervals are
much harder to acquire.
Internal Representations Calibrate Interval Timing
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Figure 1. Comparison of response profiles for different ideal observers in the timing task. The responses of four different ideal observers
(columns a–d) to a discrete set of possible stimuli durations are shown (top row); for visualization purpose, each stimulus duration in this plot is
associated with a specific color. The behavior crucially depends on the combination of the modelled observer’s temporal sensorimotor noise
(likelihood), prior expectations and loss function (rows 2–4); see Figure 2 bottom for a description of the observer model. For instance, the observer’s
sensorimotor variability could be constant across all time intervals (column a) or grow linearly in the interval, according to the ‘scalar’ property of
interval timing (column b–d). An observer could be approximating the true, discrete distribution of intervals as a Gaussian (columns a–b) or with a
uniform distribution (columns c–d). Moreover, the observer could be minimizing a typical quadratic loss function (columns a–c) or a skewed cost
imposed through an external source of feedback (column d). Yellow shading highlights the changes of each model (column) from model (a). All
changes to the observer’s model components considerably affect the statistics of the predicted responses, summarized by response bias, i.e. average
difference between the response and true stimulus duration, and standard deviation (bottom two rows). For instance, all models predict a central
tendency in the response (that is, a bias that shifts responses approximately towards the center of the interval range), but bias profiles show
characteristic differences between models.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g001
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Short Uniform, red points, and 937.5 ms for Long Uniform,
green points). However, at other intervals a bias was seen towards
the mean interval of that experimental block, with subjects
reporting intervals longer than the mean as shorter than they
really were and conversely intervals shorter than the mean as
being longer than they really were. Moreover, this bias increased
almost linearly with the difference between the mean interval and
the actual interval. Qualitatively, this bias profile is consistent
with most reasonable hypotheses for the prior, likelihoods and
loss functions of an ideal Bayesian observer (even though details
may differ).
The standard deviation of the response (Figure 3 bottom)
showed a roughly linear increase with interval duration, in
agreement with the ‘scalar property’ of interval timing [25],
according to which the variability in a timing task grows in
proportion to the interval duration.
These results qualitatively suggest that the temporal context
influences subjects’ performance in the motor-sensory timing task
in a way which may be compatible with a Bayesian interpretation,
Figure 2. Time interval reproduction task and generative model. Top: Outline of a trial. Participants clicked on a mouse button and a yellow
dot was flashed x ms later at the center of the screen, with x drawn from a block-dependent distribution (estimation phase). The subject then
pressed the mouse button for a matching duration of r ms (reproduction phase). Performance feedback was then displayed according to an error
map f (x,r). Bottom: Generative model for the time interval reproduction task. The interval x is drawn from the probability distribution p(x) (the
objective distribution). The stimulus induces in the observer the noisy sensory measurement y with conditional probability density ps(yDx; ws) (the
sensory likelihood), with ws a sensory variability parameter. The action u subsequently taken by the ideal observer is assumed to be the ‘optimal’
action u that minimizes the subjectively expected loss (Eq. 1); u is therefore a deterministic function of y, u~u(y). The subjectively expected loss
depends on terms such as the prior q(x) and the loss function (squared subjective error map ~f (x,r)), which do not necessarily match their objective
counterparts. The chosen action is then corrupted by motor noise, producing the observed response r with conditional probability density
pm(rDu; wm) (the motor likelihood), where wm is a motor variability parameter.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g002
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and in agreement with previous work which considered purely
sensory intervals and uniform distributions [6,8,26].
Experiment 2: Uniform and Peaked distributions on the
same range
As in the first experiment six different equally-spaced intervals
were used, with two different distributions. However, in this
experiment both blocks had the same range of intervals (Medium:
600–975 ms). In one block (Medium Peaked) one of the intervals
(termed the ‘peak’) occurred more frequently than the other 5
intervals, that were equiprobable. That is, the 675 ms interval
occurred with p~7=12 with the other 5 intervals occurring each
with p~1=12. In the other block (Medium Uniform) the 6
intervals were equiprobable. The feedback gain for both blocks
was again the Skewed error map fSk!
r{x
r
.
Examination of the responses showed a central tendency as
encountered in the previous experiment (Figure 4 top). However,
despite the identical range of intervals in both blocks, subjects were
sensitive to the relative probability of the intervals [27]. In
particular, the responses in the Peaked block (light blue points)
appeared to be generally shifted towards shorter durations and this
shift was interval dependent (see Figure 5). This behavior is
qualitatively consistent with a simple Bayesian inference process,
according to which the responses are ‘attracted’ towards the regions
of the prior distribution with greatest probability mass. Intuitively,
the average (‘global’) shift of responses can be thought of as arising
from the shift in the distribution mean, from the Uniform
distribution (mean 787.5 ms) to the Peaked distribution (mean
731.3 ms); whereas interval-dependent (‘local’) effects are a
superimposed modulation by the probability mass assignments of
the distribution. This is only a simplified picture, as the biases
depend on a nonlinear inference process, which is also influenced by
other details of the Bayesian model (such as the loss function), but
the qualitative outcome is likely to be similar in many relevant cases.
The standard deviation of the responses showed a significant
decrease in variability around the peak for the Peaked condition
(Figure 4 bottom; two-sample F-test pv0:001). This effect could
be simply due to practice as subjects received feedback more often
at peak intervals, however the local modulation of bias previously
described (Figure 5) suggests a Bayesian interpretation. In fact,
because of the local ‘attraction’ effect, interval durations close to
the peak would elicit responses that map even closer to it, therefore
compressing the perceptual variability, an example of bias-
variance trade-off [6].
The results of the second experiment show that people take into
account the different nature of the two experimental distributions,
in agreement with previous work that found differential effects in
temporal reproduction for skewed vs uniform distributions of
temporal intervals on a wider, suprasecond range [27]. The
performance of the subjects in the two blocks is consistent with a
Bayesian ‘attraction’ in the response towards the intervals with
higher prior probability mass. Moreover, although the average
negative shift in the response observed in the Peaked condition
versus the Uniform one might be compatible with a temporal
recalibration effect that shortens the perceived duration between
action and effect [11,28,29], the interval-dependent bias modula-
tion (Figure 5) and the reduction in variability around the peak
(Figure 4 bottom) suggest there may instead be in this case a
Bayesian explanation.
In order to address more specific, quantitative questions about
our results we set up a formal framework based on a Bayesian
observer and actor model.
Bayesian observer model
We modelled the subjects’ performance with a family of
Bayesian ideal observer (and actor) models which incorporated
both the perception (time interval estimation) and action
(reproduction) components of the task; see Figure 2 (bottom) for
a depiction of the generative model of the data. We assume that on
a given trial a time interval x is drawn from a probability
distribution p(x) (the experimental distribution) and the observer
makes an internal measurement y that is corrupted by sensory
noise according to the sensory likelihood ps(yDx; ws), where ws is a
parameter that determines the sensory (estimation) variability.
Subjects then reproduce the interval with a motor command of
duration u. This command is corrupted by motor noise, producing
the response duration r – the observed reproduction time interval
– with conditional probability density pm(rDu; wm) (the motor
likelihood), with wm a motor (reproduction) variability parameter.
Subjects receive an error specified by a mapping f (x,r) and we
assume they try to minimize a (quadratic) loss based on this error.
Table 1. Summary of experimental layout for all experiments.
Experiment Subjects Interval range Distribution Peak probability Feedback
1 n~4 Short Uniform { Skewed
Long Uniform {
2 n~6 Medium Uniform { Skewed
Medium Peaked 7/12
3 n~6 Medium Uniform { Standard
4 n~3 Medium High-Peaked 19/24 Standard
5 a n~4 Medium Bimodal 1/3 and 1/3 Standard
5 b n~4 Wide Wide-Bimodal See text Standard
Each line represents an experimental block, which are grouped by experiment; subjects in Experiment 1 and 2 took part in two blocks, whereas in Experiment 5 two
distinct groups of subjects took part in the two blocks. For each block, the table reports number of subjects (n), interval ranges, type of distribution, probability of the
‘peak’ (i.e. most likely) intervals and shape of performance feedback. Tested ranges were Short (450–825 ms), Medium (600–975 ms), Long (750–1125 ms) and Wide
(450–1125 ms), each covered by 6 intervals (10 for the Wide block) separated by 75 ms steps. Distributions of intervals were Uniform (1/6 probability per interval),
Peaked/High-peaked (the ‘peak’ interval at 675 ms appeared with higher probability than non-peak stimuli, which were equiprobable), Bimodal (intervals at 600 and
975 ms appeared with higher probability) and Wide-Bimodal (intervals at 450–600 ms and 975–1125 ms appeared with higher probability). The Skewed feedback takes
the form !
r{x
r
whereas the Standard feedback !r{x, where r is the reproduced duration and x is the target interval in a trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.t001
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In our model we assume that subjects develop an internal
estimate of both the experimental distribution and error mapping
(the feedback associated with a response r to stimulus x), which
leads to the construction of a (subjective) prior, q(x), and subjective
error mapping ~f (x,r); the latter is then squared to obtain the loss
function. This allows the prior and subjective error mapping to
deviate from their objective counterparts, respectively p(x) and
f (x,r).
Following Bayesian decision theory, the ‘optimal’ action u(y) is
calculated as the action u that minimizes the subjectively expected loss:
u(y)~arg min
u
ð
ps(yDx; ws)q(x)pm(rDu; wm)~f 2(x,r)dxdr ð1Þ
where the integral on the right hand side is proportional to the
subjectively expected loss. Combining Eq. 1 with the generative model
of Figure 2 (bottom) we computed the distribution of responses of an
ideal observer for a target time interval x, integrating over the hidden
internal measurement y which was not directly accessible in our
experiment.
Therefore the reproduction time r of an ideal observer, given
the target interval x, is distributed according to:
p(rDx; ws,wm)~
ð
ps(yDx; ws)pm(rDu(y); wm)dy: ð2Þ
Eqs. 1 and 2 are the key equations that allow us to simulate our
task, in particular by computing the mean response bias and
standard deviation of the response for each interval (Section 1 in
Text S1). Eq. 1 represents the internal model and deterministic
decision process adopted by the subject whereas Eq. 2 represents
probabilistically the objective generative process of the data.
Notice that the experimental distribution p(x) and objective error
mapping f (x,r) do not appear in any equation: the distribution of
responses of ideal observers only depends on their internal
representations of prior and loss function.
Figure 3. Experiment 1: Short Uniform and Long Uniform blocks. Very top: Experimental distributions for Short Uniform (red) and Long
Uniform (green) blocks, repeated on top of both columns. Left column: Mean response bias (average difference between the response and true
interval duration, top) and standard deviation of the response (bottom) for a representative subject in both blocks (red: Short Uniform; green: Long
Uniform). Error bars denote s.e.m. Continuous lines represent the Bayesian model ‘fit’ obtained averaging the predictions of the most supported
models (Bayesian model averaging). Right column: Mean response bias (top) and standard deviation of the response (bottom) across subjects in both
blocks (mean+ s.e.m. across subjects). Continuous lines represent the Bayesian model ‘fit’ obtained averaging the predictions of the most supported
models across subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g003
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Eqs. 1 and 2 describe a family of Bayesian observer models, a
single Bayesian ideal observer is fully specified by picking (i) a noise
model for the sensory estimation process, ps(yDx; ws); (ii) a noise
model for the motor reproduction process pm(rDu; wm); (iii) the
form of the prior q(x); and (iv) the loss function ~f 2(x,r) (Figure 6
and Methods). To limit model complexity, in the majority of our
analyses we used the same likelihood functions (ps, pm and their
parameters ws, wm) for both the generative model (Eq. 2) and the
internal model (Eq. 1). Analogously, for computational reasons in
our basic model we assumed a quadratic exponent for the loss
function (Eq. 1); in a subsequent analysis we relaxed this
requirement (Section 2 in Text S1).
Bayesian model comparison
To study the nature of the internal model adopted by the
participants, we performed a full Bayesian model comparison over
the family of Bayesian ideal observer models. For each participant
we assumed that the sensory and motor noise, the approximation
strategy for the priors, and the loss function were shared across
different experimental blocks. The model comparison was
performed over a discrete set of model components, that is,
possible choices for the priors, loss functions and shape of
likelihoods (Figure 6). In particular, priors and loss functions did
not have continuous parameters, as a parametric model would
likely be ambiguous or hard to interpret, with multimodal
posterior distributions over the parameters (as multiple combina-
tions of likelihoods, prior and cost function can make identical
predictions). Instead, we considered a finite number of parameter-
free models of loss function, prior and shape of likelihoods, leaving
only two continuous parameters for characterizing the sensory and
motor variability.
Both sensory and motor noise were modelled with Gaussian
distributions whose means were centered on the interval and
whose standard deviations could either be constant or ‘scalar’, that
is, grow linearly with the interval (Figure 6 i and ii). We used two
parameters, ws and wm, which represent the coefficient of
variation of the subject’s sensory and motor noise. For the scalar
Figure 4. Experiment 2: Medium Uniform and Medium Peaked blocks. Very top: Experimental distributions for Medium Uniform (light
brown) and Medium Peaked (light blue) blocks, repeated on top of both columns. Left column: Mean response bias (average difference between the
response and true interval duration, top) and standard deviation of the response (bottom) for a representative subject in both blocks (light blue:
Medium Uniform; light brown: Medium Peaked). Error bars denote s.e.m. Continuous lines represent the Bayesian model ‘fit’ obtained averaging the
predictions of the most supported models (Bayesian model averaging). Right column: Mean response bias (top) and standard deviation of the
response (bottom) across subjects in both blocks (mean + s.e.m. across subjects). Continuous lines represent the Bayesian model ‘fit’ obtained
averaging the predictions of the most supported models across subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g004
Internal Representations Calibrate Interval Timing
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 7 November 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e1002771
case this simply specifies the coefficient of proportionality of the
standard deviation with respect to the mean, whereas in the
constant case it specifies the proportion of noise with respect to a
fixed interval (787.5 ms).
We considered three different possible subjective error metrics
corresponding to the Skewed error ~fSk(x,r)!
r{x
r
(the error map
we provided experimentally), the Standard error ~fSt(x,r)!r{x,
and a Fractional error ~fFr(x,r)!
r{x
x
(Figure 6 iv), which were
then squared to obtain the loss function (see also Methods). Note
that scaling these mappings does not change the optimal actions
and hence the model selection process.
We compared different approximation schemes for the priors,
such as the true discrete distribution (Figure 6 iii, a) or a single
Gaussian whose mean and standard deviation matched those of
the true prior (b). We also considered two smoothed versions of the
experimental distribution with a weak (c) and strong (d) smoothing
parameter, or some other block-dependent approximations, e.g.
for the Uniform blocks we considered a uniform distribution over
the stimulus range (e); see Methods for a full description. To
constrain the model selection process, we assumed that subjects
adopted a consistent approximation scheme across blocks.
For each participant we computed the support for each model
based on the psychophysical data, that is the posterior probability
of the model, Pr(model| data). Assuming an a priori indifference
among the models, this corresponds (up to a normalization factor)
to the model marginal likelihood Pr(data| model), which was
obtained by numerical integration over the two-dimensional
parameter space (ws and wm).
We then calculated the Bayesian model average for the response
mean bias and standard deviation, shown by the continuous lines
in Figure 3 and 4. Note that the Bayesian model ‘fits’ are obtained
by computing the marginal likelihood of the models and
integrating the model predictions over the posterior of the
parameters (model averaging), with no parameter fitting. The
mean biases fits show a good quantitative match with the group
averages (R2§0:95 for all blocks); the standard deviations are
typically more erratic and we found mainly a qualitative
agreement, as observed in previous work [6].
For each participant of Experiments 1 and 2 we computed the
most probable (i) sensory and (ii) motor likelihoods, (iii) priors and
(iv) loss function (Table S1). The model comparison confirmed
that the best noise models were represented by the ‘scalar’
variability, which had relevant support for both the sensory
component (7 subjects out of 10) and the motor component (8
subjects out of 10). This result is consistent with previous work in
both the sensory and motor domain [5,6,25,30]. The most
supported subjective error map was the Skewed error (7 subjects
out of 10), which matched the feedback we provided experimen-
tally. The priors most supported by the data were typically
smooth, peaked versions of the experimental distributions. In
particular, according to the model comparison, almost all subjects
(9 out of 10) approximated the discrete uniform distributions in the
Uniform blocks with normal distributions (same mean and
variance as the true distribution; Figure 6 iii top, b). However,
in Experiment 2 most people (5 out of 6) seemed to approximate
the experimental distribution in the Peaked block not with a
standard Gaussian, but with a skewed variant of a normal
distribution (Figure 6 iii bottom, d, f and g), suggesting that their
Figure 5. Experiment 2: Difference in response between Medium Peaked and Medium Uniform blocks. Difference in response between
the Medium Peaked and the Medium Uniform conditions as a function of the actual interval, averaged across subjects (+1 s.e.m.). The experimental
distributions (light brown: Medium Uniform; light blue: Medium Peaked) are plotted for reference at bottom of the figure. The dashed black line
represents the average response shift (difference in response between blocks, averaged across all subjects and stimuli), with the shaded area
denoting+ s.e.m. The average response shift is significantly different from zero ({32:2+ 7:9 ms; two-sample t-test pv10{7), meaning that the two
conditions elicited consistently different performance. Additionally, the responses were subject to a ‘local’ (i.e. interval-dependent) modulation
superimposed to the average shift, that is, intervals close to the peak of the distribution (675 ms) were attracted towards it, in addition to the average
shift, while intervals far away from the peak were less affected. (*) The response shift at 600 ms and 825 ms is significantly different from the average
response shift; pv0:01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g005
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responses were influenced by higher order moments of the
true distribution and not just the mean and variance (see
Discussion).
For Experiment 2 we also relaxed some constraints on the
priors, allowing the model selection to pick a Medium Uniform
prior for the Medium Peaked block and vice versa. Nevertheless,
the model comparison showed that the most supported models
were still the ones in which the priors matched the block
distribution, supporting our previous findings that subjects’
responses were consistent with the temporal context and changed
when switching from one block to another (as visible in Figure 4).
Nonparametric reconstruction of the priors
To study in detail the internal representations, we relaxed the
constraint on the priors. Rather than choosing from a fixed set of
candidate priors (Figure 6 iii), we allowed the prior to vary over a
much wider class of smooth, continuous distributions. We assumed
that the noise models and loss function emerging from the model
comparison were a good description of the subjects’ decision
making and sensorimotor processing in the task. We therefore
fixed these components of the observer’s model and inferred
nonparametrically, on an individual basis, the shape of the priors
most compatible with the measured responses (Figure 7; see
Methods for details).
Examination of the recovered priors shows that the subjective
distributions were significantly different from zero only over the
range corresponding to the experimental distribution, with only
occasional tails stretching outside the interval range (e.g. Figure 7
bottom left). This suggests that in general people were able to
localize the stimulus range in the blocks. The priors did not
typically take a bell-like shape, but rather we observed a more or
less pronounced peak at the mean of the true distribution, with the
remaining probability mass spread over the rest of the range.
Interestingly, the group averages for the Uniform priors over the
Short, Medium and Long ranges (Figure 7 top right, both, and
bottom right, light brown) exhibit very similar, roughly symmet-
rical shapes, shifted over the appropriate stimulus range.
Conversely, the Peaked prior (Figure 7 bottom right, light blue)
had a distinct, skewed shape.
To compare the inferred priors with the true distribution, we
calculated their distribution moments (Table 2). We found that the
first three moments of the inferred priors (in the table reported as
mean, standard deviation and skewness) were statistically indistin-
guishable from those of the true distributions for all experimental
conditions (Hotelling’s multivariate one-sample T2 test consider-
ing the joint distribution of mean, standard deviation and skewness
against the true values; pw0:45 for all blocks). This result
confirmed the previously stated hypothesis that participants had
Figure 6. Bayesian observer and actor model components. Candidate (i) sensory and (ii) motor likelihoods, independently chosen for the
sensory and motor noise components of the model. The likelihoods are Gaussians with either constant or ‘scalar’ (i.e. homogeneous linear) variability.
The amount of variability for the sensory (resp. motor) component is scaled by parameter ws (resp. wm). iii) Candidate priors for the Medium Uniform
(top) and Medium Peaked (bottom) blocks. The candidate priors for the Short Uniform (resp. Long Uniform) blocks are identical to those of the
Medium Uniform block, shifted by 150 ms in the negative (resp. positive) direction. See Methods for a description of the priors. iv) Candidate
subjective error maps. The graphs show the error as a function of the response duration, for different discrete stimuli (drawn in different colors). From
top to bottom: Skewed error ~fSk(r,x)!
r{x
r
; Standard error ~fSt(r,x)!r{x; and Fractional error ~fFr(r,x)!
r{x
x
. The scale is irrelevant, as the model is
invariant to rescaling of the error map. The squared subjective error map defines the loss function (as per Eq. 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g006
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developed an internal representation which included higher order
moments and not just the mean and variance of the experimental
distribution. However, when including the fourth moment
(kurtosis) in the analysis, we observed a statistically significant
deviation of the recovered priors with respect to the true
distributions (Hotelling’s T2 test with the joint distribution of the
first four moments; pv10{4 for all blocks); in particular, the
inferred priors seem to have more pronounced peaks and/or
heavier tails. First of all, note that the heightened kurtosis is not an
artifact due to the averaging process across subjects or the
sampling process within subjects, as we averaged the moments
computed for each sampled distribution (see Methods) rather than
computing the moments of the average distribution. In other
words, all recovered priors are (on average) heavy tailed, it’s not
just the mean prior that it is ‘accidentally’ heavy tailed as a mixture
of light-tailed distributions. So this result could mean that the
subjects’ internal representations are actually heavy-tailed, for
instance to allow for unexpected stimuli. However, there could be
a simpler explanation that the presence of outliers arise from
occasional trivial mistakes of the participants. We, therefore,
considered a straightforward extension of our model which added
the possibility of occasional ‘lapses’ with a lapse rate l, where the
response in a lapse trial is simply modelled as a uniform
distribution over a wide range of intervals (Section 3 in Text
S1). In terms of marginal likelihood, generally the models with
lapse performed better than the original models, but with no
qualitative difference in the preferred model components. Cru-
cially, we did not observe a significant change in the kurtosis of the
recovered priors, ruling out the possibility that the heightened
kurtosis had been caused by trivial outliers.
Our analysis therefore showed that, according to the inferred
priors, people generally acquired internal representations that
were smooth, heavy-tailed approximations to the experimental
distributions of intervals, in agreement up to the first three
moments.
Experiment 3: Effect of the shape of feedback on the loss
function
In our ideal observer model we compared three candidate loss
functions: Skewed, Standard and Fractional (Figure 6 iv). The
results of the model comparison in the first two experiments with
Skewed feedback showed that there was a good match between
experimentally provided feedback and subjective error metric.
However, we could not rule out the possibility, albeit unlikely, that
participants were ignoring the experimental feedback and
following an internal error signal that just happened to be similar
in shape to the Skewed error. We therefore performed an
additional experiment to verify that subjects behavior is driven by
the feedback provided.
We again used a Medium Uniform block but now with Standard
error f (x,r)!r{x as feedback (see Figure S5 in Text S2). The
model comparison for this group showed that the responses of 4
subjects out of 6 were best explained with a Standard loss function.
Moreover, no subject appeared to be using the Skewed loss function
(Table S1). These results confirm that most people correctly
integrate knowledge of results with sensory information in order to
minimize the average (squared) error, or an empirically similar
metric. Furthermore, all inferred individual priors showed a
remarkable agreement with a smoothed approximation of the
experimental distribution of intervals (Figure 8 top), suggesting that
the Standard error feedback may be easier to use for learning. As in
the previous experiments, the average moments of the inferred
priors (up to skewness) were statistically indistinguishable from those
of the true distribution, with a significant difference in the kurtosis
(Table 3 left; Hotelling’s T2 test, first three moments: pw0:95; first
four moments: pv10{7).
Figure 7. Nonparametrically inferred priors (Experiment 1 and 2). Top row: Short Uniform (red) and Long Uniform (green) blocks. Bottom
row: Medium Uniform (light brown) and Medium Peaked (light blue) blocks. Left column: Nonparametrically inferred priors for representative
participants. Right column: Average inferred priors. Shaded regions are +1 s.d. For comparison, the discrete experimental distributions are plotted
under the inferred priors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g007
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Experiment 4: High-Peaked distribution
In the Peaked block we did not observe any significant
divergence from the Bayesian prediction. However, the ratio of
presentations of ‘peak’ intervals (675 ms) to the others was low
(1.4) and possibly not enough to induce other forms of temporal
adaptation [29,31]. To examine whether we might see deviations
from Bayesian integration for larger ratios we therefore tested
another group of subjects on a more extreme variant of the Peaked
distribution in which the peak stimulus had a probability of p&0:8
and therefore a ratio of about 4.0. We provided feedback through
the Standard error mapping, as the previous experiment had
showed that subjects can follow it at least as well as the Skewed
mapping.
Due to the large peak interval presentation frequency we had
fewer test data points in the model fitting. Therefore, we
constrained the model comparison by only considering the
Standard loss in order to prevent the emergence of spurious
model components capturing random patterns in the data. We
found that the recovered internal priors were in good qualitative
agreement with the true distribution, with statistically indistin-
Table 2. Main statistics of the experimental distributions and nonparametrically inferred priors (Experiment 1 and 2; Skewed
feedback).
Short Uniform Long Uniform
Objective Subjective Objective Subjective
Mean (ms) 637.5 644.2 + 12.8 937.5 929.9 + 19.6
Std (ms) 128.1 117.4 + 13.3 128.1 131.2 + 16.9
Skewness 0 20.17 + 0.24 0 20.12 + 0.41
Ex. Kurtosis 21.27 0.86 + 1.24 21.27 0.82 + 0.98
Medium Uniform Medium Peaked
Objective Subjective Objective Subjective
Mean (ms) 787.5 805.7 + 27.4 731.3 724.1 + 24.0
Std (ms) 128.1 130.4 + 23.5 106.6 110.13 + 18.5
Skewness 0 20.16 + 0.41 1.14 0.78 + 0.42
Ex. Kurtosis 21.27 0.80 + 1.44 0.09 2.20 + 2.39
Comparison between the main statistics of the ‘objective’ experimental distributions and the ‘subjective’ priors nonparametrically inferred from the data. The subjective
moments are computed by averaging the moments of sampled priors pooled from all subjects (+1 s.d.); see Figure 7, right column and Methods for details. In statistics,
the excess kurtosis is defined as kurtosis {3, such that the excess kurtosis of a normal distribution is zero. Heavy tailed distributions have a positive excess kurtosis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.t002
Figure 8. Nonparametrically inferred priors (Experiment 3 and 4). Top row: Medium Uniform (light brown) block. Bottom row: Medium High-
Peaked (dark blue) block. Left column: Nonparametrically inferred priors for representative participants. Right column: Average inferred priors. Shaded
regions are +1 s.d. For comparison, the discrete experimental distributions are plotted under the inferred priors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g008
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guishable means (Figure 8 bottom, and Table 3; one sample two-
tailed t-test pw0:90). When variance and higher moments were
included in the analysis, though, the distributions were signifi-
cantly different (Hotelling’s T2 test, mean and variance: pv0:05;
first three moments: pv0:01; first four moments: pv10{7)
suggesting that the distribution may have been ‘too peaked’ to
be learnt exactly; see Discussion. Nevertheless, the observed biases
of the responses were well explained by the basic Bayesian models
(group mean: R2~0:95), and the standard deviations were in
qualitative agreement with the data (Figure S6 in Text S2).
Experiment 5: Bimodal distributions
Our previous experiments show that people are able to learn
good approximation of flat or unimodal distributions of intervals
relatively quickly (a few sessions), under the guidance of corrective
feedback. Previous work in sensorimotor learning [15] and motion
perception [32] has shown that people can learn bimodal
distributions. Whether the same is attainable for temporal
distributions is unclear; a recent study of time interval reproduc-
tion [27] obtained less definite results with a bimodal ‘V-shaped’
distribution, although training might have been too short, as
subjects were exposed only to 120 trials in total and without
performance feedback.
To examine whether subjects could easily learn bimodality of a
temporal distribution with the help of feedback we tested two new
groups of subjects on bimodal distributions of intervals on a
Medium range (600–975 ms, as before) and on a Wide range
(450–1125 ms), providing in both cases Standard feedback. In the
Medium Bimodal block the intervals at 600 and 975 ms had each
probability p~4=12, whereas the other four middle intervals (675,
750, 825, 900 ms) had each probability p~1=12. In the Wide
Bimodal block the six ‘extremal’ intervals (450, 525, 600 ms
and 975, 1050, 1125 ms) had each probability p~4=28 whereas
the middle intervals had probability p~1=28. Note that in both
cases extremal intervals were four times as frequent as middle
intervals.
In the Medium Bimodal block, subjects’ responses exhibited a
typical central tendency effect (Figure 9 top left) which suggests
that people did not match the bimodality of the underlying
distribution. To constrain the model comparison we inferred the
subjects’ priors under the assumption of scalar sensory and motor
noise models and Standard loss function, as found by our previous
analyses. As before, we first used a discrete set of priors (see
Methods) that we used to compute the model ‘fit’ to the data and
then we performed a nonparametric inference. The nonparame-
trically inferred priors for the Medium Bimodal distribution
(Figure 9 top right) suggest that on average subjects developed an
internal representation that differed from those seen in previous
experiments and, as before, we found a good agreement between
moments of the experimental distribution and moments of the
inferred priors up to skewness (Table 4 left). However, results of
the Bayesian model comparison among a discrete class of flat,
unimodal or bimodal priors do not support the hypothesis that
subjects actually learnt the bimodality of the experimental
distribution (data not shown). Part of the problem may have been
that in the Medium Bimodal distribution the two modes were
relatively close, and due to sensory and motor uncertainty subjects
could not gather enough evidence that the experimental distribu-
tion was not unimodal (but see Discussion). We repeated the
experiment therefore on a wider range with a different group of
subjects.
The pattern of subjects’ responses in the Wide Bimodal block
shows a characteristic ‘S-shaped’ bias profile (Figure 9 top right)
which is compatible with either a flat or a slightly bimodal prior.
The nonparametrically inferred priors for the Wide Bimodal
distribution (Figure 9 bottom right) again suggest that on average
subjects acquired, albeit possibly with less accuracy (Table 4 right),
some broad features of the experimental distribution; however
individual datasets are quite noisy and again we did not find strong
evidence for learning of bimodality.
Our results with bimodal distributions confirm our previous
finding that people seem to be able to learn broad features of
experimental distributions of intervals (mean, variance, skewness)
with relative ease (a few sessions of training with feedback).
However, more complex features (kurtosis, bimodality) seem to be
much harder to learn (see Discussion).
Discussion
Our main finding is that humans, with the help of corrective
feedback, are able to learn various statistical features of both
simple (uniform, symmetric) and complex (peaked, asymmetric or
bimodal) distributions of time intervals. In our experiments, the
inferred internal representations were smooth, heavy tailed
approximations of the experimental distributions, in agreement
typically up to third-order moments. Moreover, our results suggest
that people take into account the shape of the provided feedback
and integrate it with knowledge of the statistics of the task in order
to perform their actions.
The statistics of the responses of our subjects in the Uniform
blocks were consistent with results from previous work; in
particular, we found biases towards the mean of the range of
intervals (central tendency) [6,8,26,33] and the variability of the
responses grew roughly linearly in the sample interval duration
(scalar property) [6,34]. The responses in the Peaked and High-
Table 3. Main statistics of the experimental distributions and nonparametrically inferred priors (Experiment 3 and 4; Standard
feedback).
Medium Uniform Medium High-Peaked
Objective Subjective Objective Subjective
Mean (ms) 787.5 782.6 + 18.7 703.1 702.0 + 17.9
Std (ms) 128.1 131.7 + 13.6 80.5 119.5 + 17.9
Skewness 0 0.03 + 0.30 2.25 0.67 + 0.37
Ex. Kurtosis 21.27 0.42 + 0.53 20.86 1.66 + 1.32
Comparison between the main statistics of the ‘objective’ experimental distributions and the ‘subjective’ priors nonparametrically inferred from the data. The subjective
moments are computed by averaging the moments of sampled priors pooled from all subjects (+1 s.d.); see Figure 8, right column and Methods for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.t003
Internal Representations Calibrate Interval Timing
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 12 November 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e1002771
Peaked blocks showed analogous biases, but they were directed
towards the mean of the distribution rather than the mean of the
range of intervals (the two means overlapped in the Uniform case)
[27]. We also observed a significant reduction in variability at the
peak. These results were sufficient to suggest that subjects
considered the temporal statistics of the context in their decision
making processes. We found a similar regression to the mean for a
‘narrow’ bimodal distribution (Medium Bimodal), in qualitative
agreement with previous work that found a simple central
tendency with a ‘V-shaped’ temporal distribution [27] (although
with very limited training, no feedback and a suprasecond range).
However, for a bimodal distribution on a wider range we observed
‘S-shaped’ biases which seem compatible with a nonlinear decision
making process [15]. However, more refined conclusions needed
the support of a formal framework.
Bayesian model
Our modelling approach consisted of building a family of
Bayesian observer and actor models, which provided us with a
mathematical structure in which to ask specific questions about
our subjects [35], going beyond mere statements about Bayesian
optimality. In particular, we were interested in (1) whether people
would be able to learn nontrivial temporal distributions of intervals
and what approximations they might use, and (2) how their
responses would be affected by performance feedback. Our
observer model resembled the Bayesian Least Squares (BLS)
Figure 9. Experiment 5: Medium Bimodal and Wide Bimodal blocks, mean bias and nonparametrically inferred priors. Very top:
Experimental distributions for Medium Bimodal (dark purple, left) and Wide Bimodal (light purple, right) blocks. Top: Mean response bias across
subjects (mean + s.e.m. across subjects) for the Medium Bimodal (left) and Wide Bimodal (right) blocks. Continuous lines represent the Bayesian
model ‘fit’ obtained averaging the predictions of the most supported models across subjects. Bottom: Average inferred priors for the Medium
Bimodal (left) and Wide Bimodal (right) blocks. Shaded regions are +1 s.d. For comparison, the experimental distributions are plotted again under
the inferred priors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.g009
Table 4. Main statistics of the experimental distributions and nonparametrically inferred priors for bimodal distributions
(Experiment 5; Standard feedback).
Medium Bimodal Wide Bimodal
Objective Subjective Objective Subjective
Mean (ms) 787.5 794.5 + 34.2 787.5 822.1 + 70.7
Std (ms) 160.6 155.7 + 37.2 251.6 219.2 + 29.3
Skewness 0 20.33 + 0.39 0 20.22 + 0.57
Ex. Kurtosis 21.72 20.08 + 0.90 21.64 20.40 + 0.51
Comparison between the main statistics of the ‘objective’ experimental distributions and the ‘subjective’ priors nonparametrically inferred from the data. The subjective
moments are computed by averaging the moments of sampled priors pooled from all subjects (+1 s.d.); see Figure 9, bottom and Methods for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002771.t004
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observer described in [6], but it explicitly included an action
component as part of the internal model. Moreover, to answer (1)
we allowed the prior to differ from the experimental distribution,
and to study (2) we considered additional shapes for the loss
function in addition to the Standard squared loss !(r{x)2.
The Bayesian model comparison gave us specific answers for
each of our subjects, and a first validation came from the success of
the most supported Bayesian observer and actor models in
capturing the statistics of the subjects’ responses in the task.
However, goodness of fit per se is not necessarily an indicator that
the components found by the model comparison reflected true
findings about the subjects, rather than ‘overfitting’ arbitrary
statistical relationships in the data. This is of particular relevance
for Bayesian models, because of the underlying degeneracy among
model components [21].
Our approach consisted in considering a large, ‘reasonable’ set
of observer models that we could link to objective features of the
experiment. This does not solve the degeneracy problem per se but
it prevents the model comparison from finding arbitrary solutions.
In particular, the set of experiments was designed in order to
provide evidence that each element of the model mapped on to an
experimentally verifiable counterpart; crucially, we found that a
change in a component of the experimental setup (e.g. experi-
mental distribution and feedback) correctly induced a switch in the
corresponding inferred component of the model (prior and loss
function). We also avoided overfitting by limiting our basic models
to only two continuous noise parameters, which were then
computed through model averaging and further validated by
independent direct measures.
To further validate our methods, we directly measured the
subject’s noise parameters (sensory and motor noise, w
0
s and w
0
m) in
separate tasks and compared them with the model parameters ws,
wm inferred from the main experiments (see Section 4.1 in Text S1
for full description). The rationale is that, in an idealized situation,
we would be able to measure some features of the subjects with an
objective, independent procedure and the same features would be
predictive of the individual performances in related tasks [16]. The
measured parameters were highly predictive of the group
behavior, and reasonably predictive at the individual level for
the sensory parameter, confirming that the model parameters were
overall correctly representing objective ‘noise properties’ of the
subjects.
Overall, our modelling techniques were therefore validated by
(a) goodness of fit, (b) consistency between inferred model
components and experimental manipulations, and (c) consistency
between the model parameters and independent measurements of
the same quantities.
Comparison between inferred priors and experimental
distributions
Given the validation of the results of the model comparison, we
performed a nonparametric inference of the priors acquired by
participants during the task. Other recent works have inferred the
shape of subjective ‘natural’ perceptual priors nonparametrically,
such as in visual orientation [24] and speed [36] perception, but
studies that focussed on experimentally acquired priors mostly
recovered them under parametric models (e.g. Gaussian priors
with variable mean and variance) [35,37–39]. The nonparametric
method allowed us to study the accuracy of the subjects in learning
the experimental distributions, comparing summary statistics such
as the moments of the distributions up to fourth order. Note that
the significance and reliability of the recovered priors is based on
the correctness of our assumptions regarding the observer and
actor model; unconstrained priors might capture all sorts of
statistical details, one of the typical objections to Bayesian
modelling [40]. However, by dividing the model selection stage
(and its validation) from the prior reconstruction process we
prevented the most pathological forms of overfitting.
The internal representations inferred from the data show a good
agreement with the central moments of the true distributions
typically up to third order (mean, variance and skewness). Subjects
however showed some difficulties in learning variance and
skewness when the provided distribution was extremely peaked,
with a width less than the subjects’ perceptual variability. This
discrepancy observed in the High-Peaked block may have arisen
because (a) the experimental distribution’s standard deviation was
equal or lower in magnitude compared to the perceptual
variability of the subjects (experimental distribution standard
deviation: 80.5 ms; subject’s average sensory standard deviation at
the mean of the distribution: 96:1+ 12:1 ms; mean + sd across
subjects) and (b) due to the shape of the distribution, subjects had
much less practice with intervals away from the peak. Another
explanation is that subjects’ representation of relative frequencies
of different time intervals was systematically distorted, with
overestimation of small relative frequencies and underestimation
of large relative frequencies (see [41] for a critical review), but note
that this would arguably produce a change in the mean of the
distribution as well, which we did not observe.
Moreover, the recovered priors in all blocks had systematically
heavier tails (higher kurtosis) than the true distributions. By
exploring an extended model that included lapses we ruled out
that this particular result was due to trivial outliers in our datasets.
However, our results are compatible with other more sophisticated
reasons for the heavy tails we recovered, in particular (a) the
objective likelihoods might be non-Gaussian, with heavier tails
[42], and (b) the loss functions might follow a less-than-quadratic
power law [43], hypothesis for which we found some evidence,
although inconclusive, by studying observer models with non-
quadratic loss functions (Section 2 in Text S1). Experimentally,
both (a) and (b) would imply that in our datasets there would be
more outliers than we would expect from a Gaussian noise model
with quadratic losses.
Our experiments with bimodal distributions show that, although
people’s responses were affected by the experimental distribution
of intervals in a way which is clearly different from our previous
experiments with uniform or peaked distributions, the inferred
priors in general fail to capture bimodality and are consistent
instead with a broad uniform or multimodal prior (where the peaks
however do not necessarily fall at the right places). Note that the
average sensory standard deviation for subjects in Experiment 5
was 87+ 18 ms (Medium Bimodal; mean + sd across subjects)
and 106+ 28 ms (Wide Bimodal), calculated at the center of the
interval range. In other words, in both blocks, the centers of the
peaks were well-separated in terms of perceptual discriminability
(on average by at least four standard deviations). This suggests that
most subjects did not simply fail to learn the bimodality of the
distributions because they had problems distinguishing between
the two peaks.
Temporal recalibration and feedback
Lag adaptation is a robust phenomenon for which the perceived
duration between two inter-sensory or motor-sensory events
shortens after repeated exposure to a fixed lag between the two
[10,11,44]; see [45] for a review. It is currently uncertain whether
lag adaptation is a ‘global’ temporal recalibration effect (affecting
all intervals) [46], ‘local’ (affecting only intervals in a neighborhood
of the adapter lag) [47], or both. What is clear is that lag
adaptation cannot be interpreted as a Bayesian effect in terms of
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prior expectations represented by the sample distribution of
adaptation and test intervals, since its signature is a ‘repulsion’
from the adapter as opposed to the ‘attraction’ induced by a prior
[4,47,48].
Our experimental setup for the peaked blocks mimicked the
distributions of intervals of typical lag adaptation experiments
[11,29], with the adapter interval set at 675 ms (the ‘peak’).
However, we did not detect any noticeable disagreement with the
predictions of our Bayesian observer model and, in particular,
there was no significant ‘repulsion effect’ from the peak, neither
global nor local. Our results suggest that people are not subject to
the effects of lag adaptation, or can easily compensate for them, in
the presence of corrective feedback.
Sensorimotor lag adaptation seems to belong to a more general
class of phenomena of temporal recalibration which induce an
adjustment of the produced (or estimated) timing of motor
commands to meet the goals of the task at hand. In the case of
experimentally induced actuator delays in a time-critical task, such
as controlling a spaceship through a minefield in a videogame [49]
or driving a car in a simulated environment [50], visual temporal
information about delays provides an obvious, compelling reason
to recalibrate the timing of actions. However, feedback regarding
timing performance need not be provided only in temporal ways.
Previous studies have shown that people take into account
performance feedback (knowledge of results) when the feedback
about the timing of their motor response is provided in various
ways, such as verbal or visual report in milliseconds [23,51] or bars
of variable length [52]. Interestingly, people tend to also follow
‘erroneous’ feedback [52–54]. However, this can be explained by
the fact that people’s behavior in a timing task is goal-oriented (e.g.
minimizing feedback error), and therefore these experiments
suggest that people are able to follow external, rather than
erroneous, feedback. In fact, when participants are told that
feedback might sometimes be incorrect, which corresponds to
setting different expectations regarding the goal of the task, they
adjust their timing estimates taking feedback less into account [53].
Ambiguity regarding the goal of a timing task with non-obvious
consequences – as opposed to actions that have obvious
sensorimotor consequences, such as catching a ball – can be
reduced by imposing an explicit gain/loss function [5,55], and it
has been found that people can act according to an externally
presented asymmetric cost (even though their timing behavior is
not necessarily ‘optimal’ [55]).
Our work extends these previous findings by performing a
model comparison with different types of symmetric and
asymmetric loss functions and providing additional evidence that
most people are able to correctly integrate an arbitrary external
feedback in their decision process, while executing a sensorimotor
timing task, so to minimize the feedback error.
Bayesian sensorimotor timing
There is growing evidence that many aspects of human
sensorimotor timing can be understood in terms of Bayesian
decision theory [3,5,6]. The mechanism through which people
build time estimates, e.g. an ‘internal clock’, is still unclear (see
[56] for a review), but it has been proposed that observers may
integrate both internal and external stochastic sources of temporal
information in order to estimate the passage of time [7,57].
Inspired by these results, in our work we assumed that people
build an internal representation of the temporal distribution of
intervals presented in the experiment. However, for all timing
tasks in which more or less explicit knowledge of results is given to
the subjects (e.g. ours, [6,26]), an alternative explanation is that
people simply learn a mapping from a duration measurement to a
given reproduction time (strategy known as table look-up), with no
need of learning of a probability distribution [58]. At the moment
we cannot completely discard this possibility, but other timing
studies have shown that people perform according to Bayesian
integration even in the absence of feedback both for simple [4,8]
and possibly skewed distributions [27], suggesting that people
indeed take into account the temporal statistics of the task in a
context-dependent way. Moreover, previous work in motor
learning in the spatial domain has shown that people do not
simply learn a mapping from a stimulus to a response, but adjust
their performance according to the reliability of the sensory
information [15], a signature of probabilistic inference [59].
Analogous findings have been obtained in multisensory integration
[18,60,61] and for visual judgements (‘offset’ discrimination task)
under different externally imposed loss functions [20], crucially in
all cases without knowledge of results. All these findings together
support the idea that sensorimotor learning follows Bayesian
integration, also in the temporal domain. However, the full extent
of probabilistic inference in sensorimotor timing needs further
study, possibly involving transfer between different conditions in
the absence of knowledge of results [58].
Our results answer some of the questions raised in [6], in
particular about the general shape of the distributions internalized
by the subjects and the influence of feedback on the responses. An
avenue for further work is related to the detailed profile of the
likelihoods and possible departures from the scalar property
[34,62] (see also Section 4 in Text S1), especially in the case of
complex experimental distributions. It is reasonable to hypothesize
that strongly non-uniform samples of intervals might affect the
shape of the likelihood itself, if only for the simple reason that
people practice more on some given intervals. Cognitive,
attentional and adaptation mechanisms might play various roles
in the interaction between nonuniform priors and likelihoods, in
particular without the mitigating effect of knowledge of results. A
relatively less explored but important research direction involves
extending the model to a biologically more realistic observer and
actor model, examining the connections with network dynamics
[12,63] or population coding [31], bridging the gap between a
normative description and mechanistic accounts of time percep-
tion. Another extension of the model would consider a non-
stationary observer, whose response strategy changes from trial to
trial (even after training), possibly in order to account for
sequential effects of judgement which may be due to an iterative
update of the prior [64–66]. Finally, whereas our analysis suggests
that subjects found it relatively easy to learn unimodal distributions
of intervals, bimodal distributions seemed to represent a much
harder challenge. Further work is needed to understand human
performance and limitations with multimodal temporal distribu-
tions.
Methods
Ethics statement
The University of Edinburgh School of Informatics ethics
committee approved the experimental procedures and all subjects
gave informed consent.
Participants
Twenty-five subjects (17 male and 8 female; age range 19–34
years) including the first author participated in the study. Except
for the first author all participants were naı¨ve to the purpose of the
study. All participants were right-handed, with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and reported no neurological disorder.
Participants were compensated for their time and an additional
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monetary prize was awarded to the three best naı¨ve performers
(lowest mean squared error).
The first author took part in three of the experiments and was
included as he represents a highly trained and motivated
participant. Therefore it allowed an informal means to assess
whether the author’s data was different from those of the naı¨ve
participants which could reflect a lack of training or motivation.
However, analysis of the author’s datasets (response biases and
moments of the inferred priors) were statistically indistinguishable
from the other participants and therefore his data was included in
the analysis.
Materials and stimuli
Participants sat in a dimly lit room, *50 cm in front of a Dell
M782p CRT monitor (160 Hz refresh rate, 640|480 resolution).
Participants rested their hand on a high-performance mouse which
was fixed to a table and hidden from sight under a cover. The
mouse button was sampled at 1 kHz (with a 13+ 1 ms latency).
Participants wore ear-enclosing headphones (Sennheiser EH2270)
playing white noise at a moderate volume, thereby masking any
experimental noise. Stimuli were generated by a custom-written
program in MATLAB (Mathworks, U.S.A.) using the Psycho-
physics Toolbox extensions [67,68]. All timings were calibrated
and verified with an oscilloscope.
Task
Each trial started with the appearance of a grey fixation cross at
the center of the screen (27 pixels, 1:50 diameter). Participants
were required to then click on the mouse button at a time of their
choice and this led to a visual flash being displayed on the screen
after a delay of x ms which could vary from trial to trial. The flash
consisted of a circular yellow dot (1:50 diameter and 1:50 above the
fixation cross) which appeared on the screen for 18.5 ms (3
frames). The ‘target’ interval x ms was defined from the start of the
button press to the first frame of the flash, and was drawn from a
block-dependent distribution p(x). Participants were then required
to reproduce the target interval by pressing and holding the mouse
button for the same duration. The duration of button press (r ms)
was recorded on each trial. Participants were required to wait at
least 250 ms after the flash before starting the interval reproduc-
tion, otherwise the trial was discarded and re-presented later. After
the button release, 450–850 ms later (uniform distribution),
feedback of the performance was displayed for 62 ms. This
consisted of a rectangular box (height 2:50, width 200) in the lower
part of the screen with a central vertical line representing zero
error and a dotted line representing the reproduction error on that
trial. The horizontal position of the error line relative to the zero-
error line was computed as either fSk(x,r)~k:
r{x
r
(Skewed
feedback) or fStd (x,r)~k:
r{x
787:5
(Standard feedback), depending
on the experimental condition, with k~400 pixels (22:20).
Therefore, for a response r that was shorter than the target
interval x the error line was displayed to the left of the zero-error
line, and the converse for a response longer than the target
interval. The fixation cross disappeared 500–750 ms after the
error feedback, followed by a blank screen for another 500–
750 ms and the reappearance of the fixation cross signalled the
start of a new trial.
Experiments
Each session consisted of around 500 trials and was broken up
into runs of 84–96 trials. Within each run the number of each
interval type was set to reflect the underlying distribution exactly
and the order of the presentations was then randomized. However,
for the High-Peaked session we ensured that each less likely
interval was always preceded by 3–5 ‘peak’ intervals. Subjects
could take short breaks between runs.
Each experiment consisted of a number of blocks, each
comprising of several sessions. Within each block, the sessions were
identical with regard to interval and feedback type. The participants
were divided into experimental groups as follows (see also Table 1):
Experiment 1: Short Uniform and Long Uniform blocks with
Skewed feedback (4 participants, including the first author).
Experiment 2: Medium Uniform and Medium Peaked blocks with
Skewed feedback (6 participants, including the first author).
Experiment 3: Medium Uniform block with Standard feedback (6
participants, including the first author). Experiment 4: Medium High-
Peaked block with Standard feedback (3 participants). Experiment 5:
Medium Bimodal with Standard feedback (4 participants) and Wide
Bimodal with Standard feedback (4 participants).
The order of the blocks for Experiments 1 and 2 were
randomized across subjects. Each block consisted of three to six
sessions, terminating when the participant’s performance had
stabilized (fractional change in mean squared timing error between
sessions less than 0.08). For Experiment 5 we required participants
to perform a minimum of five sessions.
Data analysis
We examined the last two sessions of each block, when
performance had plateaued so as to exclude any learning period of
the experiment. We analysed all trials for the uniform distributions
and Wide Bimodal block. For the non-uniform distributions, we
picked a random subset of the frequently-sampled intervals such that
all intervals contributed equally in the model comparison (results were
mostly independent of the chosen random subset), with the exception
of the Wide Bimodal block for which we would have had too few data
points per interval. For each subject we therefore analysed about
1000 trials for the Uniform or Wide Bimodal blocks,*500 for the
Peaked or Medium Bimodal block and *200 trials for the High-
Peaked block. We discarded trials with timestamp errors (e.g. multiple
or non-detected clicks) and trials whose response durations fell outside
a block-dependent allowed window of 225–1237 ms (Short), 300–
1462 ms (Medium), 375–1687 ms (Long) and 225–1687 ms (Wide),
giving 124 discarded trials out of a total of*30000 trials (*0:4%).
Note that 93% of the discarded trials had response intervals less than
150 ms, which we attribute to accidental mouse presses.
Bayesian observer model components. Eqs. 1 and 2
describe the family of Bayesian observers models. The behavior of
an observer is defined by the choice of four components:
(i) a noise model for the sensory estimation process, which can
be either constant or scalar:
ps(yDx; ws)~
N yDx,ws:787:5ð Þ (constant)
N yDx,wsxð Þ (scalar)

ð3Þ
where N xDm,sð Þ is a normal distribution with mean m and
standard deviation s.
(ii) a noise model for the motor reproduction process, which
can be either constant or scalar:
pm(rDu; wm)~
N rDu,wm:787:5ð Þ (constant)
N rDu,wmuð Þ (scalar)

ð4Þ
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(iii) the approximation scheme for the priors. We considered:
(a) the true, discrete distribution; (b) a single Gaussian with
same mean and variance as the true distribution; (c) a
mixture of six (ten for the Wide range) 37.5 ms standard
deviation Gaussians centered on the true discrete intervals
with mixing weights equal to the relative probability of the
true intervals; (d) as c but with standard deviation of 75 ms;
(e) a continuous uniform distribution from the shortest to
the longest interval. For Experiment 2 and 4 we also
considered a mixture of two Gaussians with mixing weights
p and 1{p, with p equal to the proportion of ‘peak’
intervals that emerge from the uniform background
distribution (p~0 for the Uniform block, p~0:5 for the
Peaked block and p~0:75 for the High-Peaked block). The
first Gaussian is centered on the peak (675 ms) and with a
small (f: 37.5 ms) or large (g: 75 ms) standard deviation, the
second Gaussian is centered on the mean of the Medium
range (787.5 ms) and with standard deviation equal to the
discrete Uniform distribution (128.7 ms). Therefore, for the
Medium Uniform block approximation schemes f and g
reduce to a single Gaussian. Analogously, for Experiment 5
we considered a mixture of three Gaussians with mixing
weights p, p and 1{2p, with p equal to the total frequency
of one of the two ‘peaks’ emerging from the uniform
background distribution (p~1=4 for the Medium Bimodal
block and p~9=28 for the Wide Bimodal block). The first
two Gaussians are centered on the peaks (Medium: 600 ms
and 975 ms; Wide: 525 ms and 1050 ms) and with a small
(f: Medium: 37.5 ms; Wide: 61.2 ms) or large (g: twice the
small) standard deviation. The third Gaussian is centered on
the mean of the range (787.5 ms) and with standard
deviation equal to the discrete Uniform distribution over
the range (Medium: 128.7 ms; Wide: 251.6 ms). The values
of standard deviations for the ‘peak’ Gaussians (small
37.5 ms, large 75 ms) were chosen as 75 ms is the gap
between time intervals in all experimental distributions. For
the Wide Bimodal block, 61.2 ms is the standard deviation
of the sample for three intervals separated by 75 ms.
(iv) the loss function
~f 2(x,r)~
r{x
r
 2
(Skewed)
r{xð Þ2 (Standard)
r{x
x
 2
(Fractional)
8>>><
>>:
ð5Þ
Note that the Fractional error was not used as a feedback
shape in the experiments, but we included it as a possibility
for the Bayesian observer as it might represent an
appropriate error signal if time has a logarithmic
representation in the brain [69]. In fact, the logarithmic
squared loss reads:
log r{log xð Þ2~ log r
x
 2
~ log 1z
r{x
x
h i 2
&
r{x
x
 2
for
r{x
x
 %1
For an analysis with non-quadratic loss function see also
Section 2 in Text S1.
Bayesian model comparison. For each observer model and
each subject’s dataset (that is all blocks within an experiment) we
calculated the posterior probability of the model given the data,
Pr(model| data)! Pr(data| model), assuming a flat prior over the
models.
The marginal likelihood is given by
Pr(datajmodel)~
ð
dwsdwm Pr(data j ws, wm, model)
Pr(ws, wmjmodel)
ð6Þ
where Pr(ws,wm| model) is the prior over the parameters and
Pr(data|ws,wm, model) is the likelihood of the data given a specific
model and value of the parameters. For the prior over the
parameters we assumed independence between parameters and
models Pr(ws,wm| model) ~ Pr(ws)Pr(wm) and for both param-
eters we used a broad Beta prior * Beta(1.3, 2.6) that slightly
favors the range 0:03{0:3 in agreement with a vast literature on
human timing errors [34]. The likelihood of the data was
computed according to our observer model, Eq. 2, assuming
independence across trials:
Pr(data wsj , wm, model)~ P
n
i~1
p r(i)Dx(i); ws,wm
  ð7Þ
with n the total number of test trials and x(i),r(i) respectively the
target interval and response in the i{th test trial. Note that the
calculation of p rDxð Þ (Eq. 2) requires a computation of the optimal
action u, that is, the action u that minimizes the expected loss (Eq.
1). The minimization was performed analytically for the Standard
and Fractional loss function and numerically for the Skewed loss
function (function fminbnd in MATLAB; we assumed that u
always fell in the interval 20{2000 ms; the results were checked
against analytical results obtained through a polynomial expansion
approximation of the loss function that holds for D
r{x
x
D%1).
We computed the marginal likelihood through Eqs. 6 and 7
both with a full numerical integration and using a Laplace
approximation (both methods gave identical results). Given the
posterior probability for each model, for each subject we
calculated the posterior probability for each model component
(by fixing a model component and summing over the others); see
Table S1. The ‘Bayesian fits’ in Figure 3, 4, 9 top and Figure S5
and S6 in Text S2 were obtained by calculating the model average
for the response bias and response standard deviation (the average
was taken both over parameters and over models, but typically
only one of the models contributed significantly to the integral).
Nonparametric reconstruction of the priors. To examine
the subjects’ priors using a nonparametric approach, for each
subject we took the (i) sensory and (ii) motor noise and (iv) loss
function, as inferred from the model comparison. We then
allowed the priors to vary independently over a broad class of
smooth, continuous distributions. For each block, the log prior
was specified by the values of ten (14 for the Wide range) control
points at 75 ms steps over the ranges: Short 300–1025 ms,
Medium 450–1175 ms, Long 600–1325 ms and Wide 300–
1325 ms. The control points were centered on the interval range
of the block but extended outside the range to allow for tails or
shifts. The prior q(x) was calculated by interpolating the values
of the prior in log space with a Gaussian process [70] with
squared exponential covariance function with fixed scale (sy~1
in log space, ‘~75 ms) and a small nonzero noise term to favor
conditioning. The Gaussian processes were used only as a
smooth interpolating method and not as a part of the inference.
In order to infer the prior for each subject and block, we sampled
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from the posterior distribution of priors! Pr(data| prior, model)
using a slice sampling Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm
[71]. We ran ten parallel chains (3000 burn-in samples, 1500
saved samples per chain) obtaining a total of 15000 sampled
priors per subject and block. For each sampled prior we
calculated the first four moments (mean, standard deviation,
skewness and excess kurtosis) and computed the mean and
standard deviation of the moments across the sample sets of
individual subjects and over the sample set of all subjects (the
latter are shown in Table 2 and 3).
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Table S1 Bayesian model comparison: most supported
observer model components for Experiments 1–4. Most
supported observer model components (posterior probability), for
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text includes sections on: computation of response bias and
standard deviation of the response for the basic Bayesian observer
model; a Bayesian observer model with non-quadratic loss
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